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Law of Naval Warfare as Applicable to 
Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping 
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is indeed a great pleasure to be back at the Naval 
War College with this distinguished group of international lawyers, diplomats, 
historians, naval lawyers and line officers from the United States and Allied 
nations. This subject is complex but timely, and deserves the attention of all of 
us. The War College is to be commended for conducting this symposium on 
the Law of Naval Warfare related to targeting enemy merchant shipping. 
I wish to commend AdmiralJim Service on a fine presentation. His decision 
matrix for the commanders on the scene is particularly helpful. I will build on 
his remarks and present other considerations which may be useful to interna-
tionallawyers in formulating rules of conduct governing naval warfare. I will 
confine my remarks to the operational considerations in targeting enemy 
merchant shipping. 
I certainly agree that future wars will be heavily influenced by modem 
technological advances in weaponry. Today, there is a booming international 
arms market in modem submarines, mines, long range reconnaissance and ASW 
aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, land based surface to air missiles, chemical 
weapons, coastal defense missiles, ballistic missiles, and, alarmingly, nuclear 
proliferation. When you consider that there are active ballistic missile programs 
in countries as diverse as Argentina, Iraq, India, China and Israel and that the 
warheads could be chemical, nuclear or conventional, at least some form ofSDI 
does not sound unreasonable. 
Forty countries in the Third World receive military hardware from other 
Third World export industries in addition to developed countries. There are 48 
countries with anti-ship cruise missiles (2100 Harpoons, 2600 Exocets, 10,000 
SS-N-2's). There are 19 countries with diesel attack submarines, 21 countries 
with naval mining capabilities and 10-16 countries with chemical warfare 
capabilities. There are increasing numbers of sophisticated submarines available 
to the Third.World in the future, (examples: India and Brazil building SSN'S; 
the French Rubis - 3000 ton SSN; advanced air-independent propulsion schemes 
for diesel submarines - Swedish Stirling engine, West German fuel cell research, 
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Canadian low power nuclear reactor, Italian Toroidal). India has purchased 6 
Soviet Kilo's and 2 West Gennan Type 209 diesels. 
Recall that a World War II vintage mine (100-125 kg whd) put the USS 
Roberts out of action. A hit on the side of the ship nearly broke it in hal( Superb 
damage control by the crew saved the ship. However, mines did limited damage 
to oilers in the Persian Gul£ 
Aerospatiale and MBB are working on a supersonic successor to the Exocet 
called ANS. It is stealthy (low radar cross-section), Mach 2+, 15G maneuver, 
dual mode (radar and IR) guidance, range 180 km, sea-skimmer (20 ft, off deck), 
ramjet and integral solid booster propulsion. A current sub-sonic Exocet in 
the Falklands sank HMS Sheffield, damaged HMS Glamorgan and sunk the 
merchant Atlantic Conveyor (2 Exocets). In the Persian Gulf, Exocets put 
the USS Stark out of action but did limited damage to large oilers; the oil kept 
flowing. 
In Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2 ASW carriers, 15 frigates, 6 submarines of the 
Royal Navy plus various ASW aircraft expended over 200 weapons against only 
1 Argentine submarine and a sea full of false contacts. 
As the examples above indicate, the vulnerability of modem naval platforms 
even, or perhaps especially, in limited war situations will be a factor. A 
Commander must take into consideration the various threats to his own forces 
if he is tasked to destroy or interdict merchant ships, or to protect merchant 
ships as in the Persian Gulf situation. As Admiral Guilbault pointed out, the 
threat also involves the threat of detection from space or other active and passive 
means, including the visual sighting of a flaming datum. 
Let us now look at a general war scenario - NATO versus Warsaw Pact. This 
situation is possible but gets more unlikely each day. The NATO maritime 
strategy is to take the war to the enemy. An early ASW campaign is con-
templated. NATO naval forces would conduct offensive operations in Soviet 
sea denial zones (2000 km from the "homeland," usually) and impose a high 
attrition on Soviet naval forces, thereby neutralizing their military capabilities 
and assuring freedom of the seas to support u.S. and Allied operations and 
control the critical sea lines of communications that link the Allies with deployed 
forces. 
Naval forces would support the land battle on the flanks. Amphibious forces 
might be landed. u.S. and Allied submarines, aircraft and surface ships will be 
far too busy with limited assets targeting enemy submarines, surface ships, airfields, 
d sites, bases and facilities ashore to waste weapons and risk detection in targeting 
enemy merchant ships. At this stage, Warsaw Pact shipping has little military 
value considering their extensive and internal land lines of communication. A 
mining campaign in the Baltic and Black Seas and Arctic Ocean would be more 
to the point. 
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In a general war, the Warsaw Pact has a similar problem. The first priority of 
their SSNs will probably be to protect their SSBNs in nuclear reserve. If any 
remain, they will attack ships of the Battle Group, amphibious forces or 
underway replenishment groups. Soviet Naval Air has a similar priority and has 
insufficient assets to risk higher casualties by attacking NATO merchant shipping 
in the Atlantic. If the situation became an attrition war against the sea lines of 
communications, similar to World War II, NATO would convoy its merchant 
ships and the Soviets would attempt to sink without warning. One might argue 
that the strict rules in the London Protocol of 1936 should apply to Allied 
merchant ships sailing independently in sanitized lanes. However, one would 
have to assume that the protocol would be violated or at best interpreted 
narrowly. 
Let us tum to the case of a limited war. Here the situation changes drastically. 
The characteristics of a low level or regional conflict are different from a general 
war. For example: 
- Usually the battle space and sea room are constrained. 
- Forces are usually concentrated rather than dispersed. 
- Forces operate near or over land and in shallow water, thus making the forces 
more vulnerable and degrading certain sensors and weapon systems. 
- The visual and electronic environment is confused with a mixture of friendly, 
enemy and neutral ships and aircraft. 
- There is a low tolerance for damage and personnel casualties, including hostages, 
at least in the U.S. Generally, the public's attention span and tolerance vis-a-vis 
uses of military force will be directly proportional to the loss ofHfe in the action, 
factored by its duration. 
- There are definite rules of engagement constraints on offensive and defensive 
actions. Admiral Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint ChiefS ofSta{f, stated 
that one of his achievements during his tenure was to modifY the rules of 
engagement so that U.s. forces in crisis situations could take defensive action 
without absorbing the first blow. 
- The identification assessments are complex, e.g., the incident in the Persian Gulf 
when the USS Vincennes mistakenly identified a commercial aircraft as a military 
aircraft and shot it down with surface to air missiles. 
- Friendly support and assistance are varied and unpredictable. 
- The threat can be from land, boats, ships, submarines, mines, fighters, bombers, 
helicopters, swimmers and unmanned vehicles. 
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- There are political constraints on the use of force that may be far more 
stringent than the legal constraints in the Commander's Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations (NWP-9). 
- There is a high incentive to keep the superpowers from direct confron-
tation or from taking one side or the other. 
- Ground commitments will be less tolerable than naval commitments. 
The above considerations apply generally in the case of regional conflicts. In 
the case of targeting enemy merchant ships, there are other problems. Ideally, 
one should have a global array of sensors, weapons and delivery systems plus an 
intelligence network including communication and signal intelligence that can 
sort out various merchant ships while still in port and then continuously track 
the particular ship all the way to its final destination. What is needed is a complete 
library of the electronic, acoustic and visual fingerprints of all merchant shipping; 
an identification and assessment of cargo as it is loaded; the probable shipping 
routes; a space surveillance system that can continuously track the merchant ship 
while at sea irrespective of whether or not the ship is emitting electronic signals; 
a command, control and communication system that can hand off the track to 
surface ships, aircraft and/or submarines that are positioned to target the 
previously identified enemy merchant ship; weapons that can be fired beyond 
the radar or visual horizon with the discrimination to hit the right merchant ship 
and with the accuracy and speed to compensate for the time late in firing at a 
moving target and the right warhead to accomplish the mission - (which is not 
necessarily to sink the enemy merchant ship). I would much rather have a low 
cost weapon that is designed to render the ship immobile - dead in the water -
with damaged propellers or ship control capability - than have to clean up the 
oil spill from a 300,000 ton tanker. I doubt if the Coast Guard wants to clean it 
up either. In a limited war or crisis control situation, environmental considera-
tions are going to be important factors. 
No nation has the complete capability as I have just described. Some do worse 
than others. Iraq fired Exocets on large radar contacts hoping the ship was a 
tanker. We know that Iraq made at least one mistake in the Stark incident. Iran 
planted mines and harassed all merchant ships indiscriminately with missiles and 
small caliber ammunition fired from helicopters and small ships. 
I would have to say that measured against the ideal merchant targeting system 
described above, u.S. capability is marginal at best. We have no comprehensive 
library of fingerprints. As yet, we do not have a space based radar satellite system 
for surveillance of the surface of oceans. We have space assets and sensors that 
are useful under various conditions, but the ability to keep a continuous track 
and sort all the friendly, enemy and neutral merchant ships that ply the oceans 
is limited. Our over the horizon targeting system for long range weapons like 
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Harpoon and Tomahawk against moving targets leaves much to be desired in 
terms of hitting the right target on time in a confused environment of friendly, 
enemy and neutral merchant ships. Our ships, submarines and aircraft are 
designed primarily for attacking enemy warships, submarines, aircraft and 
striking targets ashore. Our weapons are optimized for those missions, not for 
use against merchant ships. We have no low cost weapon in numbers for 
disabling a merchant ship. This is not to say that we don't have weapons to use, 
but a Tomahawk cruise missile at $1.2 million a copy and in short supply would 
not be the weapon of choice against a merchant ship. 
What I am really saying is that targeting enemy ships in a limited war is a 
tough job. Because of the difficulty in detecting, tracking, and identifying targets 
in broad ocean areas, the operational commander is forced to search in confined 
littoral areas, probably near the destination of the particular merchant ship. Then 
he must use ships and aircraft on scene to locate, track, visually identifY and then 
assess the character of the particular merchant ship. I recall in 1974 during the 
Cyprus Crisis, I was a Battle Group commander aboard the carrier Forrestal with 
accompanying cruisers and destroyers and submarines. I was ordered to take a 
position well south of Cyprus just to make sure the Soviets understood that they 
were not to get involved in the conflict between Greece and Turkey with their 
Mediterranean Squadron. I was also tasked to maintain continuous surveillance 
in the Mediterranean between Greece and Cyprus and make reports on all ships 
in the area, particularly Greek warships. We flew the airwing round the clock 
starting at dawn trying to keep an updated surface picture. It was a back-breaking 
operation and we were only partially successful. We could at least sort out 
merchant ships from Greek warships but as far as sorting out various merchant 
ships one from the other, that was another problem. There were just too many 
of all types of ships at sea. 
Now the situation has improved. We have better intelligence, sensors, 
surveillance aircraft and space assets, but it is still a tremendous challenge. 
There is technology available to fill in the gaps in an optimum enemy 
merchant ship surveillance, tracking and targeting system. For example: an active 
space based surveillance system, imaging radar, infrared techniques, and other 
technical approaches would help in establishing a coherent surface picture. The 
Global Positioning System (GPS) will help. I am sure that Admiral Guilbault 
could devise a space and C 3 tracking and handoff system that could do the job 
if we gave him the money to do it. I think we should press on with developing 
the new technology. Limited conflicts and regional crises put a higher premium 
on intelligence, surveillance, identification, and accurate assessments. In our 
planning we often assume that limited war is a lesser included offense of general 
war and that ships, aircraft, sensors and weapon systems designed for general war 
are automatically suitable in low intensity conflicts. That is often not the case 
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and we need to look more closely at our limited war capabilities and make 
improvements. 
Thus far, I have assumed that in a limited war the u.s. Navy would be tasked 
to sink enemy merchant ships. This is possible, but unlikely in my judgment. If 
we are so tasked, we would probably be politically constrained to visit and search 
procedures to accurately determine the character, destination and cargo of the 
ship, before taking further action. This means close surveillance by ships and 
aircraft, using visual means to establish identities. I believe it would be counter-
productive to embark on a campaign of sinking enemy merchant ships at sea in 
a limited war when there are much more lucrative and politically important 
fixed targets ashore that could contribute to the limited objective at hand. The 
Libyan strike is a good example. 
I think it more likely that the u.s. Navy will be in the role of protecting 
merchant shipping and assuring freedom of the seas for world commerce. A 
disruption in world shipping will have a rippling effect in the interrelated world 
economies that probably cannot be tolerated for long by either the developed 
or developing countries. In this situation, the incentive will be to confine the 
conflict geographically, limit the participants, persuade the maritime nations and 
"superpowers" to cooperate in keeping the sea lines of communication open, 
and encourage, cajole or threaten the belligerents to negotiate. The u.s. Navy 
may be tasked to convoy merchant ships, provide for their protection against a 
variety of threats, sort out neutral merchant ships from belligerents, and use force, 
as necessary, to contribute to political objectives. 
However, whether we end up protecting merchant shipping or targeting 
them, the requirement for a global surveillance, sorting-out, tracking, hand-off, 
targeting and suitable engagement system for merchant shipping is still valid. We 
need to develop a coherent surface picture for the oceans of the world. In any 
event, the regional crisis and limited war situation need a fresh approach. While 
the general roles and missions of the u.s. Navy may remain the same, the 
methods ofimplementation may be significantly changed. Commanders will not 
have a free hand in carrying out their mission. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
will be dictated by the National Command Authority and blessed by the State 
Department. The political constraints may be far more stringent than any legal 
restraints in NWP-9. Minimizing loss of life, both military and civilian, and 
damage to property or the environment will be important factors. Weapon 
systems and sensors may have to be tailored to be more useful in limited wars 
and crisis control. The Navy may have to adjust to new missions such as assisting 
in drug enforcement and the like. There is a continuing and vital role for the 
u.s. Navy, but the Navy must be flexible enough and have the capability to 
adapt to changing conditions. 
Although the policy and ROE constraints in a given limited conflict scenario 
might be quite stringent, naval commanders must find flexibility in the laws of 
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naval warfare to target enemy merchant ships if the need arises. This may require 
a reassessment or fresh interpretation of the London Protocol of 1936. 
Finally, a note of caution in all that I have said about limited conflicts and 
regional crisis. First, the Navy must retain its capability to fight a general war if 
necessary. Second, while a limited conflict might necessitate new ways of 
implementation and a certain tailoring of sensors and weapons, it by no means 
follows that the aircraft, surface ships and submarines can be less capable and 
sophisticated. The opposite is more likely the case. 
*Consultant, Applied Physics Laboratory, John Hopkins University. Former Professor of Law, George 
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